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Extending the line of prior research on information technology material weaknesses (ITMWs) 
in internal controls, our study examines whether chief information officer (CIO) turnover is 
affected by the disclosure of ITMW and whether CIO turnover will affect subsequent 
remediation of ITMW. We find that ITMW disclosure exerts a negative influence on CIO 
turnover, which adds to prior findings on the effects of ICMW disclosure leading to chief 
executive officer (CEO) turnover and chief financial officer (CFO) turnover. Further, we find 
that CIO turnover exerts a positive influence on subsequent ITMW remediation. It indicates 
that CIO dismissals and replacements do promote the success of subsequent ITMW 
remediation. 
Keywords:  CIO turnover, information technology material weaknesses, internal control, 
remediation, SOX Section 404 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to examine information technology material weaknesses (ITMWs) and the 
subsequent remediation of these material weaknesses in relation to chief information officer (CIO) 
turnover. ITMWs refer to material deficiencies in information technology (IT) that jeopardise overall 
internal control, expose firms to vulnerability and risks and impair the legitimacy of firms (Considine 
et al. 2012). Accordingly, numerous federal and state legislations including the Section 404 of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) have added requirements for maintaining an effective IT control system, giving the 
issue of ITMWs increased prominence among firms. In light of the importance of IT control, we 
examine the association between ITMWs and CIO turnover and their influence on the subsequent 
remediation of ITMWs.  
SOX highlights the responsibility of executives in public firms for establishing, evaluating, and 
monitoring the effectiveness of internal control (including IT control) over financial reporting and 
disclosure. As with Section 404, executives and external auditors must report in the adequacy of their 
firm’s internal control over financial reporting (Karanja and Zaveri 2014). Further, Section 302 
specifies that the chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) must personally 
certificate the evaluation of internal control effectiveness and disclosure of any material weaknesses in 
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financial statements both quarterly and annually (Goh 2009). The Section 302 also has a trickle-down 
effect regarding CEOs and CFOs’certification. CEOs and CFOs are often not IT experts. Therefore, 
some CEOs and CFOs that are required to certify their internal controls turn to the leaders of their IT 
units such as CIOs and ask them to certify IT control evaluation as well (Damianides 2005). 
Accordingly, CIOs are also held accountable for ITMWs (Damianides 2005; Masli et al. 2016). 
Since ITMWs signal material deficiencies in internal control system, the existence of ITMWs is 
considered as a significant financial reporting failure (Haislip et al. 2015) and thereafter threatens a 
firm’s legitimacy. The legitimacy of a firm refers to “the generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995).  Firms obtain and maintain their legitimacy 
by implementing socially accepted policies and procedures (Haislip et al. 2015). It is crucial for a firm 
as it increase firms’ access to various important resources such as financial capital, experienced 
managers, qualified employees, government support, and advanced technology (Feldmann et al. 2009). 
Conversely, the cost to a firm that fails to defend legitimacy is relatively high. In a setting where a firm 
faces an event that impairs its legitimacy, they often adopt two methods to repair legitimacy: 
disassociation and creation of a monitoring mechanism (Haislip et al. 2015). To elaborate, firms can 
repair their legitimacy and restore the public’s confidence in firms by dismissing chief executives who 
are accountable for IT controls effectiveness (Li et al. 2017). As a further step, firms often establish a 
monitoring mechanism to address the deficiency and to ensure the problem does not repeat in the future 
(Haislip et al. 2015). Such creation includes the replacement of the dismissed chief executives with new 
chief executives who has better IT expertise. Prior studies find that firms that disclose ITMWs work to 
repair legitimacy by dismissing their CEOs and CFOs to signal the market that they are determined to 
remedy ITMWs (Haislip et al. 2015; Li et al. 2017). However, CIOs are the most senior executive who 
are accountable for IT control effectiveness directly. CIOs are senior executives who are responsible 
for overseeing IT infrastructures, runs the firm’s internal IT operations, and aligns the firm’s IT 
infrastructure with business priorities (Chun and Mooney 2009). In addition, the CIO role is viewed as 
vital for reducing expenditure and limiting damage by setting and maintaining internal control and 
planning for possible disasters. As a result, CIOs have a significant corporate presence, with them most 
often reporting directly to CEOs or CFOs (Luftmann and Kempaiah 2008). Do ITMWs lead to the 
turnover of CIOs, rather than CEOs and CFOs? To our knowledge, prior studies merely focus on CEO 
and CFO turnover (Haislip et al. 2015; Johnstone et al. 2011; Li et al. 2017), and few have examined 
the association between ITMW disclosure and CIO turnover. Adding to this, we examine the 
implication of ITMW disclosure on CIO turnover. 
Can the executive turnover after ITMW disclosure promote subsequent remediation? Prior research 
(Haislip et al. 2015; Li et al. 2017) shows that firms that dismiss current CEOs and replace outgoing 
CEOs are more likely to promote subsequent remediation relative to firms that retain their CEOs. As 
for CFOs, prior research provides mixed findings. For instance, Haislip et al. (2015) find that firms with 
new CFOs are more likely to remediate ITMWs in a timely manner. However, Li et al. (2017) find that 
appointment of new CFOs does not promote subsequent remediation. Thus, further research is 
warranted to explore the association between ITMW disclosure and CFO turnover. To our knowledge, 
scant research examines the implication of CIO turnover on remediation of ITMWs. Extending on this, 
our study examines whether CIO turnover does influence the subsequent remediation of ITMWs. 
To test our hypothesis, we employ two logistic regression models. The first one measures the influence 
of ITMW disclosure on CIO turnover. The dependent variable of interest is CIO turnover in year t+1, 
and the independent variable is ITMW disclosure in year t. The second one measures the influence of 
CIO turnover on subsequent ITMW remediation. The dependent variable is ITMW remediation in year 
t+2, and the independent variable is CIO turnover in year t+1. The results of first model show that 
ITMW disclosure exerts a negative effect on CIO turnover. Firms that disclose ITMWs are less likely 
to experience CIO turnover relative to firms without ITMW disclosure. The results of the second model 
show that CIO turnover exerts a positive effect on subsequent ITMW remediation. Firms that replace 
their current CIOs with new ones are more likely to successfully remedy ITMW than firms that retain 
their current CIOs. 
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Our study makes theoretical and practical contributions. Theoretically, prior research on ITMWs and 
chief executives’ turnover only focus on CEOs and CFOs. Adding to this, we explore how ITMW 
disclosure impacts CIO turnover. We further explore the impact of CIO turnover on subsequent ITMW 
remediation. We provide a more complete understanding of the association between ITMWs and chief 
executives’ turnover and the underlining factors that influence ITMW remediation. Practically, our 
study has implication for managers dealing with ITMW disclosure and ITMW remediation. Firms lean 
to replace CEOs and CFOs in the wake of ITMW disclosure however replacing CEOs and CFOs may 
not be the only mean to help repair ITMW. On top of CEOs and CFOs turnover, replacing CIOs can 
further increase the ITMW remediation rate. 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
ITMW and CIO Turnover 
IT controls are crucial enablers of the operation of strong financial controls in a company (White 2014). 
According to Haislip et al. (2015) compared with other types of internal control material weaknesses, 
ITMWs have a more adverse influence on the control environment, risk assessment, and monitoring, 
resulting in less reliable financial reporting and generating more negative consequences. These adverse 
effects cause lower levels of earnings performance (Stoel and Muhanna 2011), less accurate 
management forecasts (Li et al. 2012), and a higher number of future internal control material 
weaknesses (Klamm et al. 2012). The disclosure of ITMWs signals to the general public that executives 
are not capable of maintaining the effectiveness of IT controls over financial reporting. Also, it often 
brings adverse market reactions. For instance, initial public offering firms with deficiencies in internal 
controls often have higher audit fees and this implies that auditors perceive these firms to have the 
increased risk posed by such deficiencies (Lee 2016). In addition, stock prices react negatively to the 
disclosure of internal control material weaknesses (Hammersley et al. 2008). Investors often re-evaluate 
their prior assessment of the quality of management when their firms encounter deficiencies in internal 
controls, because investors are less confident in the executives’ oversight over financial reporting or 
their accounting information systems (Hammersley et al. 2008). Thus, investors may perceive a higher 
information risk that manifests in a higher cost of capital. Taken together, ITMW disclosure is a signal 
of the executives’ lack of understanding of IT controls, damages the legitimacy of a firm and brings 
adverse market reactions. Accordingly, firms have to take action to mitigate the damage of legitimacy 
caused by ITMWs. 
One way to mitigate this damage is to dismiss executives in charge and appoint new executives as part 
of improving monitoring mechanism. Firms adopt this approach in the encounter of negative 
performance shocks (Jenter and Kanaan 2015), financial restatements (Arthaud-Day et al. 2006), or 
decline in profitability (Dimopoulos and Wagner 2016). Through the turnover of executives, firms send 
a positive signal to the public and inform the public that the firms have a stronger intention to address 
the damage caused by the related executives. Given that the disclosure of ITMWs weakens firms’ 
legitimacy, it is anticipated that ITMWs would lead to the turnover of related executives. 
Under SOX Section 404, CEOs and CFOs are required to assess the effectiveness of IT control and 
identify ITMW as part of internal control (Ge and McVay 2005). However, CEOs and CFOs do not 
hold direct responsibility for ITMW because they are not accountable for proper assessment and 
monitoring of IT control procedures (Yayla and Hu 2014). CIOs have responsibility for the protection 
of accounting and financial information, and the documents on which the public relies in making 
investment decisions rest with the IT activities (Karanja and Zaveri 2014). Being the most IT-
knowledgeable person, CIOs are constantly consulted by other senior executives for decision-making 
in implementing IT initiatives associated with the SOX Act (Karanja and Zaveri 2014). They track the 
progress of IT initiatives and issues, and report ITMWs to CEOs and CFOs (Karanja and Zaveri 2014). 
Given that CIOs’ direct responsibilities are linked to the effectiveness of IT controls, it is expected that 
CIOs would be held accountable for ITMW. They would be penalized for poor performance outcomes 
in the encounter of ITMW. Therefore, we anticipate that the disclosure of ITMW has a positive 
influence on the subsequent CIO turnover. 
H1: The disclosure of ITMWs is positively associated with subsequent CIO turnover. 
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Remediation of ITMWs and CIO Turnover 
Remediation is a situation in which a firm discloses internal control material weaknesses in 10-K filings 
under SOX Section 404 and then, later, that the same firm discloses that internal controls were deemed 
effective suggesting these material weaknesses no longer exist (Hee 2013). Remediation of ITMWs is 
important because these deficiencies are significant threats to a firm’s daily operation, and to enhance 
the quality of financial reporting and restore confidence in financial reporting, firms have to take action 
(Goh 2009), thereby repairing their legitimacy. Firms that reports remediation plans to correct 
deficiencies would experience less adverse market reactions such as less decrease in their stock price 
compared with firm that do not initiate such plans (Rezaee et al. 2012). However, the failure to 
remediate deficiencies leads to adverse market reactions in the form of higher audit fees (Munsif et al. 
2011), poorer credit ratings and higher interest rates (Hammersley et al. 2012). 
While ITMWs firms may work to restore their damaged legitimacy by dismissing current CIOs and 
replacing new ones, it is unclear whether such steps effectively promote the remediation of ITMWs 
(Haislip et al. 2015). The passing of shift in CIOs is rarely simple and smooth, and thereby will stimulate 
changes in firms’ internal structures, processes and management. Thus, it is hard to say that the change 
of CIOs will generally promote the remediation of ITMWs or not. Existing literature discusses two 
competing arguments to explain the influence of chief executives turnover on firms’ performance 
(Boyne et al. 2011).  The first one, which is termed as the ‘disruptive view of organization change’, 
suggests that the change of chief executives in a firm is disruptive and causes a decline in firms’ 
performance (Boyne et al. 2011). To start with, current chief executives often hold unique and valuable 
firm-specific knowledge that acquired from their past experience in the firm (Wang et al. 2017). Such 
knowledge is highly idiosyncratic and tailor-made for specific situations, and is very difficult to be 
transferred or imitated (Wang et al. 2017). Therefore, chief executives turnover will lead to loss of such 
knowledge. In the context of CIO turnover, current CIOs are often directly involved in the generation 
of firm-specific knowledge of their IT infrastructures and IT employee skills (Menon and Williams 
2008), and are able to distribute resources to avenues that are mostly likely to remedy ITMWs contrast 
with new CIOs. Second, a stable relation between chief executives and employees that promotes mutual 
understanding and trust is important to encourage employees to follow their firm’s strategies. In other 
words, the introduction of new CIOs will destabilize the current IT tram and disrupt the relation between 
CIO and employees, which is likely to create conflicts and distractions in the IT team (Boyne et al. 
2011; Wang et al. 2017). The consequence is a reduction in the ability to remedy ITMWs. 
On the other hand, the second argument, which is termed as the ‘common sense model’, suggests that 
chief executives turnovers make positive difference to firms’ performance. This argument reflects the 
view that new chief executives bring new ideas and knowledge that shape the strategy of their firms, 
which is a crucial determinant of the performance of the firm (Boyne et al. 2011). In the case of CIO 
turnover, as new CIOs will bring a better fit between IT infrastructure and firms’ strategy, they are 
expected to lead better remediation of ITMWs. The argument is also consistent with the theory of 
escalation of commitment. Beginning with Staw’s (1976) research on escalation of commitment, a large 
body of literature has shown that chief executives often continue to invest in a project even when the 
project is falling. The escalation of commitment is, therefore, detrimental to firms’ performance as it 
restrains chief executives from taking optimal course of actions (Wang and Wong 2012). Following the 
same argument, current CIOs tend to overly commit in their initial project and are reluctant to admit 
their mistakes and make remediation. Overall, it suggests that CIO turnover produces improvement in 
ITMW remediation. Between the two competing arguments, we follow the later one, and posit that CIO 
turnover has a positive influence on the subsequent remediation of ITMW. 
H2: CIO turnover is positively associated with ITMW remediation in the subsequent year. 
Research Design 
Sample Selection 
We construct our sample by identifying all firms from Audit Analytics SOX 404 Internal Controls 
during the period from 2004 to 2015. Audit Analytics classifies internal control material weaknesses 
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reported in firms’annual SEC fillings into non-IT related and IT related types. Consistent with prior 
research, we record ITMW for each firm-year (Stoel and Muhanna 2011) as binary. The value ‘1’ 
indicates that the firm has at least one ITMW in the given year. The value ‘0’ indicates that the firm has 
no ITMW. Secondly, we obtain director and officer turnover data from Audit Analytics Director and 
Officer Changes. It provides the data on turnovers of CEO and CFO but limited data on turnovers of 
CIO. We then remove firm-year observation without financial data from Compustat. Finally, for firms 
with no CIO data from Audit Analytics, we conduct a manual search. In the manual data collection 
process, we search online information sources such Linkedin, Businessweek, Forbes and The Wall 
Street Journal. In the manual process, we loss a significant number of observations because there is no 
CIO data. The resultant dataset contains 7,112 firm-year observations from 890 distinct firms. 
For remediation of ITMW, we read SOX Section 404 fillings for firms that reported ITMW in year t, 
and manual code whether the ITMW has been remedied in year t+2. In Table 1, Panel A and Panel B 
present the sample reconciliation used in testing H1 and H2 respectively. The sample used to test H1 
consists of 7,112 firm-year observations. It then shrinks to 890 firm-observation in testing H2.  Note 
that remediation is defined only when a firm has an ITMW disclosure in a previous year. Hence the test 
for H2 applies only to those observations with ITMW disclosure in H1. We further restrict our sample 
to firms with at least three consecutive years of data, and it reduced the sample to 428 firm-year 
observations. 
Table 1: Sample Development 
Panel A: Sample Development H1 
Sample Selection  Firm-year 
observations 
Distinct firms 
Audit Analytics: SOX 404 internal controls 86,869  17,547 
Less: firms without Audit Analytics-Director and officer 
changes data 
 (14,480)  (3,617) 
Number of observations remaining  72,389  13,930 
Less: firms without Compustat data  (21,088)  (4,073) 
Number of observations remaining  51,301  9,857 
Less: firms with missing value in control variables  (11,446)  (1,613) 
Number of observations remaining  39,855  8,244 
Less: firms without CIO data  (32,743)  (7,354) 
Number of observations remaining  7,112  890 
Panel B: Sample Development H2 
Firm-year observations from H1 sample   7,112  890 
Less: firms without three consecutive year data  (6,614)  (547) 
Number of observations remaining  498  343 
Less: firms with missing value in control variables  (70)  (59) 
Total usable firm-year observations  428  284 
Model Development 
H1 posits a positive association between disclosure of ITMW and the subsequent CIO turnover. To test 
H1, we use a logistic regression model (Model 1). The dependent variable CIO is used to capture the 
turnover of CIOs (an indicator variable takes the value of one if there is CIO turnover in year (t+1) and 
zero if otherwise). The independent variable ITMW is used to proxy for ITMW disclosure (an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if a firm reports an ITMW in year (t) and zero if otherwise). Model 




 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐼𝑇𝑀𝑊 + 𝛽2 × 𝑀𝑊+𝛽3 ×𝐶𝐸𝑂 + 𝛽4 × 𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝛽5 × 𝐵𝐷 + 𝛽6 × 𝐴𝑇
+ 𝛽7 × 𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽8 × 𝐶𝑈𝑅 + 𝛽9 × 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽10 × 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 + 𝛽11 × 𝑅𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽12 × 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆
+ 𝛽13 × 𝐵𝐼𝐺4 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀                                    (1) 
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Following the approach of Johnstone et al. (2011), we measure the dependent variable CIO as equal 
to one if there is turnover of CIOs in year t+1. Similarly, we measure the independent variable ITMW 
as equal to one if there is discourse of ITMWs in year t. We also take account for a number of control 
variables. We control for total asset (AT), which is expected to be positively associated with the 
turnovers (Agrawal and Cooper 2017); and leverage (LEV), which  relates to levels of debt that draw 
the attention of creditors (Agrawal and Cooper 2017). In addition, following Haislip et al. (2015) and 
Johnstone et al. (2011), we include four variables to control for the effect of firm performance: current 
ratio (CUR), which indicates some assurance that the obligations coming due to the firm will be paid; 
return on assets (ROA), which measures how profitable a firm is relative to its total asset; cash from 
operation (CASHOP), related to how the firm finances short-term capital; and loss (LOSS), related to 
low revenues and low profits. Regarding other firm characteristics, we include number of board 
directors (BD), related to the cost of management, and the provision of advisory and monitoring services 
(Johnstone et al. 2011); restatement (RES), which indicates severe problems in the financial reporting 
system; big 4 auditor (BIG4), which captures the quality of internal control assessment (Li et al. 2010). 
Further, we also take into account industry fixed effect and year fixed effect. 
H2 posits a positive association between CIO turnover and the subsequent remediation of ITMWs. To 
test H2, we use another logistic regression model (Model 2). The dependent variable of interest is REM, 
which captures remediation of ITMWs (an indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is 
remediation of ITMW in year (t+1) and zero if otherwise). The independent variable is CIO as in 




 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐶𝐼𝑂 + 𝛽2 × 𝐶𝐸𝑂+𝛽3 ×𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝛽4 × 𝐵𝐷 + 𝛽5 × 𝑀𝑊 + 𝛽6 × 𝐴𝑇
+ 𝛽7 × 𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽8 × 𝐶𝑈𝑅 + 𝛽9 × 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽10 × 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 + 𝛽11 × 𝑅𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽12
× 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽13 × 𝐵𝐼𝐺4 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀               (2) 
Following Bedard et al. (2012), we measure the dependent variable REM as one if the ITMWs in year 
has been remedied in year t+2.  The independent variable of interest is 𝐶𝐼𝑂, which is the same as in 
Model 1. We control for the changes in the control variables as included in Model 1. Industry fixed 
effect and year fixed effect are taken into consideration as well. Definitions of all variable in Model 1 
and Model 2 are present in Appendix. 
Empirical Results  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 Panel A provides the descriptive statistics of the 857 firms with CIO turnover (𝐶𝐼𝑂 =  1) 
contrast with the 6,255 firms with no CIO turnover (𝐶𝐼𝑂 =  0). The likelihood of having ITMW is 
higher in firms with CIO turnover (3 percent) that in firms without CIO turnover (2 percent). However, 
the difference is non-significant (𝜒2  =  0.36). The likelihood of having CEO turnover (𝐶𝐸𝑂 =  1) is 
significant higher in firms with CIO turnover (18 percent) than that in firms with no CIO turnover (9 
percent; 𝜒2  =  68.02, 𝑝 <  0.01). Consistent with this, firms with CIO turnover also have a higher 
likelihood of CFO turnover (𝐶𝐹𝑂 =  1; 20 percent) than firms with no CIO turnover (𝐶𝐹𝑂 =  0; 
13 percent; 𝜒2  =  31.43, 𝑝 <  0.01). To the contrary, firms with CIO turnover tend to have a decrease 
in the number of board directors (29 percent) while firms with no CIO turnover tend to have an increase 
in the number of board directors (4 percent; 𝑡 =  5.51, 𝑝 <  0.01). As for other control variables, firms 
with CIO turnover tend to have a higher number of internal control material weaknesses (MW), higher 
leverage (LEV), greater loss (LOSS), lower asset (AT), lower return on asset (ROA), lower operational 
cash (CASHOP) and less likely to have a big4 audit firm (BIG4 = 1) than firms without CIO turnover.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A:  Panel B: 
Variable Distribution (Mean) by CIO  Variable Distribution (Mean) by REM 




Variable  REM  
Chi2 or 
t-stat 
  =1  =0      =1  =0   
ITMW  0.03  0.02  0.36  CIO  0.05  0.02  2.58 
CEO  0.18  0.09  68.02***  CEO  0.16  0.08  4.38** 
CFO  0.20  0.13  31.43***  CFO  0.24  0.24  0.00 
BD  -0.29  0.04  5.51***  MW  3.65  5.27  59.95*** 
MW  0.40  0.24  -4.31***  BD  0.00  -0.15  49.87** 
AT  5.68  6.55  10.36***  AT  0.38  -0.40  -2.73*** 
LEV  0.73  0.63  -2.26**  LEV  0.06  -0.43  -0.50 
CUR  2.51  2.60  0.79  CUR  0.15  -0.50  -1.53 
ROA  -0.34  -0.09  7.75***  ROA  0.29  -1.15  -2.30** 
CASH  -0.07  0.03  7.38***  CASH  0.30  -0.91  -2.30** 
RES  0.08  0.10  3.37***  RES  0.02  -0.06  4.19 
LOSS  0.48  0.32  79.43***  LOSS  0.01  0.04  0.83 
BIG4  0.53  0.68  83.74***  BIG4  0.01  -0.04  1.57 
No.  857  6,255    No.  315  113   
 Chi-squares (t-statistics) are included for dichotomous (continuous) variables.  
***, **,* denotes significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level (two-tailed), respectively.   
Table 2 Panel B presents descriptive statistics comparing 315 firms with remediation of ITMWs (REM 
= 1) with 113 without remediation (REM = 0). The likelihood of CIO turnover (𝐶𝐼𝑂 =  1) in firms 
with remediation is higher (5 percent) than that in firms with no remediation (2 percent) but the 
difference is not statistically significant (𝜒2  =  2.58). Similarly, the likelihood of CEO turnover 
(𝐶𝐸𝑂 =  1) in firms with remediation (16 percent) is higher than that in firms with no remediation (8 
percent) and the different is significant at 0.05 level (𝜒2  =  4.38, p < 05). However, the likelihood of 
CFO turnover (𝐶𝐹𝑂 =  1) in firms with remediation (24 percent) is similar to that in firms without 
remediation (23 percent; 𝜒2  =  0.57). Further, firms with remediation have little change (1 percent) in 
the number of board directors (𝐵𝐷) while firms without remediation show a decrease in the number 
of board directors (15 percent; 𝜒2  =  49.87, p < 0.05). As for other control variables, firms with 
remediation tend to have a smaller change in total asset (𝐴𝑇), return on asset (𝑅𝑂𝐴) and operational 
cash (𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻). Table 3 reports the Spearman correlation of variables. While the pairwise correlations 
are not high, some are statistically significant at 0.01 or 0.05 level, indicating some (although not severe) 
multicollinearity between variables1. 
Regression Results 
H1 predicts a positive association between the disclosure of ITMWs and CIO turnover. Table 4 Panel 
A presents the results of the logistic regression Model 1. The results show that the disclosure of ITMWs 
(ITMW) is negatively associated with CIO Turnover (CIO; p < 0.05), implying that firms with ITMWs 
are less likely to experience CIO turnover than firms without ITMWs. We then examine the marginal 
effects (dy/dx) and the results suggest that firms with ITMWs have a 6.5 percent less likelihood of CIO 
turnover than firms without ITMWs. Overall, the results contradict our H1, suggesting that the 
disclosure of ITMW is negatively associated with CIO turnover. The results may imply that when firms 
experience ITMW, they tend to hold their CIOs and rely them to fix the deficiencies in IT internal 
control. Table 4 Panel A also presents the effect of CEO turnover, CFO turnover, change in board 
                                                     
1 Control variables such as AT, LEV, ROA and LOSS may be correlated. To address the issue of 
multicollinearity, we calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF). Following prior researchers, we take 
VIF = 3.0 as the threshold. And the results show that no VIFs exceed this threshold. 
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directors and other control variables on CIO turnover. There is a positive association between CEO 
turnover (CEO) or CFO turnover (CFO) and CIO turnover, and a negative association between 
change in board directors (BD) and CIO turnover. Total asset (AT) and big4 audit firms (BIG4) are 
negatively associated with CIO turnover while loss (LOSS) and number of internal control material 
weaknesses (MW) are positive associated with CIO turnover. 
H2 suggests a positive relationship between CIO turnover and subsequent remediation of ITMW. Table 
5 Panel A presents the results of logistic regression Model 2. The results show that CIO turnover (CIO) 
is positively associated with remediation of ITMWs (REM; p < 0.1), implying that firms experience 
CIO turnover are more likely to remedy ITMWs than firms without CIO turnover. When we examine 
the marginal effects (dy/dx), our results suggest that firms change CIOs are 24 percent more likely to 
remedy ITMWs than firms do not change CIOs. Overall, the results support out H2, suggesting CIO 
turnover is positively associated with remediation of ITMWs. The result may imply that CIO dismissal 
and replacement may help subsequent ITMW remediation. Table 5 Panel A also presents the effect of 
CEO turnover, CFO turnover, change in board directors and other control variables on remediation of 
ITMWs. There is a negative association between CEO turnover (CEO) and remediation of ITMWs 
(REM) and a positive association between change in leverage (LEV) and remediation of ITMWs. The 
number of internal control material weaknesses (MW) is positively associated with remediation of 
ITMWs.           
Additional Analyses 
We conduct four additional analyses to examine the associations between the disclosure of ITMW and 
CIO turnover, and between CIO turnover and remediation of ITMW respectively. In the first analysis, 
we perform a propensity score matching analysis for Model 1. Following Achleitner et al. (2014), we 
conduct a difference in difference match based on kernel weights. We associate to the outcome (CIO) 
of firms with ITMWs a matched outcome given by a kernel-weighted average of the outcome of all 
firms without ITMWs, which yields a matched sample of 6,488 firm-year observations. We then run a 
logistic regression with the same independent and dependent variables in Model 1, and measure the 
conditional probability of receiving a CIO turnover given ITMW disclosure. We control for other 
variables used in Model 1. The results are presented in Table 5 Panel B. Consistent with our main test, 
the coefficient of ITMW is negative and marginally significant (p < 0.1), implying that the difference in 
the proportion of CIO turnover is attributable to ITMW disclosure and ITMW disclosure does affect 
CIO turnover. We perform another propensity score matching for H2 in the second analysis. We 
measure the conditional probability of ITMW remediation given CIO turnover. The results are 
presented in Table 6 Panel B. Consistent with our main test, the coefficient of CIO is positive and 
significant (p < 0.01), implying that CIO turnover does exert a strong effect on ITMW remediation. 
In the third analysis, we examine how ITMW disclosure in year t will affect CIO turnover in year t+2 
rather than year t+1. The untabulated results show a negative association between ITMW disclosure 
(ITMW) and CIO turnover (CIO). However, the association is not significant, indicating that the effect 
that exerted by ITMW disclosure on CIO turnover decreases as the time lag increases. In the fourth 
analysis, we examine how CIO turnover (CIO) in year t+1 will affect ITMW remediation (REM) in 
year t+3 rather than year t+2. The untabulated results show that CIO turnover (CIO) is positively and 
significantly (p < 0.01) associated with remediation of ITMW (REM). Overall, the results suggest that 
CIO turnover exerts a significant effect on ITMW remediation even as the time lag increases. 
Conclusion 
How to manage IT control is a conundrum faced by many chief executives in organizations (Masli et 
al. 2016).  Because of personal limitations regarding time availability and IT expertise, CEOs and CFOs 
tend to delegate most, if not all, IT management responsibilities to a specialist-subordinate (e.g., a CIO) 
(Masli et al. 2016). To untangle the conundrum, our study examines how CIO turnover is associated 
with ITMW disclosure and the subsequent remediation of ITMW. Contrary to our prediction, we find 
that CIO turnover tend to be lower in firms with ITMW disclosure than firms without ITMW disclosure.                                                                   
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Table 3: Correlation Analysis 
 
    (1)  (2) 
 (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
1. CIO   1   
  
                                                  
2 REM  0.07  1 
 
                         
3. ITMW   0.04   -1 
 1                                                 
4. MW   0.18   0.27  0.46   1                                             
5. CEO   0.17   0.09 
 0.09   0.12   1                                         
6. CFO   0.14   -0.01 
 0.06   0.10   0.11   1                                     
7. BD   -0.01   0.00 
 -0.02   -0.05   -0.03   0.03   1                                 
8. AT   -0.36   0.09 
 -0.08   -0.25   -0.09   -0.08   0.23   1                             
9. LEV   0.10   -0.09 
 0.04   0.10   0.08   0.05   0.11   0.26   1                         
10. CUR   -0.12   0.05 
 -0.04   -0.14   -0.07   -0.07   -0.10   -0.22   -0.71   1                     
11. ROA   -0.31   0.14 
 -0.09   -0.24   -0.17   -0.09   0.02   0.31   -0.25   0.17   1                 
12. CASH   -0.25   0.15 
 -0.06   -0.22   -0.13   -0.06   0.02   0.23   -0.22   0.10   0.71   1             
13. RES   -0.02   0.07 
 0.02   -0.02   0.01   -0.01   0.02   0.04   -0.03   0.02   0.02   0.05*   1         
14. LOSS   0.31   -0.03 
 0.11   0.24   0.18   0.11   -0.06   -0.43   0.15   -0.07   -0.81   -0.57   -0.04   1     
15. BIG4   -0.37   0.05  -0.15   -0.28   -0.14   -0.11   0.12   0.61   0.04   0.03   0.34   0.30   0.00   -0.37   1.00 






 CIO Turnover and Information Technology Material Weaknesses  
  
 Twenty-Third Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, China 2019  
Table 4: Logistic Regression Analysis for H1 
    Panel A: Without Matching  Panel B: Propensity Score Matching  
      First Stage  Second Stage 
Variable  Pred. Sign  DV = CIO  DV = ITMW  DV = CIO 
Intercept  ±  -2.4594***  -3.4223***  -2.7494 
ITMW  +  -0.6466**    -0.6761* 
CEO  +  0.6052***  0.0706  0.9131** 
CFO  +  0.3318***  0.0618  0.1349 
BD  ±  -0.0844***  -0.0248  -0.1797* 
AT  −  -0.0626***  -0.0005  0.1310 
LEV  +  -0.0405  -0.1017  -0.1549 
CUR  −  0.0059  -0.0075  -0.0491 
ROA  −  -0.0798  -0.1010  -0.3437*** 
CASH  −  -0.0358  0.3820**  0.3743 
RES  +  -0.0213  0.2297  -0.9726 
LOSS  +  0.2471***  0.3004**  0.4180 
BIG4  ±  -0.2058**  -0.2432*  -0.8125 
MW  +  0.0983**  0.6427***  0.1145** 
Industry Fixed Effect    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effect    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regression Type    Logistic  Logistic  Logistic 
Log Likelihood    -2457.49  -375.53  -123.58 
Likelihood Ratio    318.33  822.70  148.69 
Chi-square    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R-square    0.061  0.523  0.220 
Obs. No.    7,112  6,488  6,488 
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Table 5: Logistic Regression Analysis for H2 
    Panel A: Without Matching  Panel B: Propensity Score Matching  
      First Stage  Second Stage 
Variable  Pred. Sign  DV = REM  DV = CIO  DV = REM 
Intercept  ±  1.6436     
CIO  +  1.3703*    4.2329*** 
CEO  +  -0.1816***  -0.4728  1.0808 
CFO  +  0.0106  -1.1168  0.4683 
BD  ±  0.0930  0.3335*  0.5723* 
AT  +  0.0589  0.1980  -0.1610 
LEV  −  0.0918**  -0.1542  -0.5055 
ROA  +  0.1549*  -0.1321  0.7666 
LOSS  −  0.0388  0.0540  0.6841 
CUR  +  0.1001  0.0578  0.3316*** 
CASH  +  0.0724  0.0377  -0.0629 
BIG4  ±  0.3702  -0.8129  0.5843 
RES  ±  -0.2419  0.3741  0.5854 
MW  +  1.6436***  0.1254*  -0.3769*** 
Industry Fixed Effect    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effect    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regression Type    Logistic  Logistic  Logistic 
Log Likelihood    -195.26  -52.57  -5.50 
Likelihood Ratio    103.58  31.81  44.86 
Chi-square    0.000  0.426  0.030 
Pseudo R-square    0.210  0.232  0.469 
Obs. No.    428  193  193 
Z-statistics in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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It indicates that in the face of ITMWs disclosures, rather than dismiss CIOs, firms tend to keep their 
CIOs and depend them to remedy ITMWs. Further, we find that ITMW remediation tends to be higher 
in firms that replace current CIOs than firms that keep their CIOs. Taken together, the results suggest 
that CIO turnover has a positive influence in ITMW remediation, however, it has not yet fully 
recognized by firms. 
Our study intends to make several contributions. Theoretically, it contributes to the research on internal 
control by providing a linkage between CIO turnover and ITMWs. We offer two insights. First, firms 
are likely to hold their current CIOs to resolve failures regarding IT control. Second, dismissing current 
CIOs and replacing with new ones are likely to resolve failures regarding IT controls more effectively. 
Practically, our study provides implications for internal control management and practice. Although 
suggested by prior research that dismissal of chief executives may be an effective way to defend the 
legitimacy of firms, firms tend to only focus on the dismissal of CEOs and CFOs but not CIOs. 
However, dismissing of CIOs and replacing outgoing CIOs with ones with better expertise is actually 
crucial to the remediation of ITMWs. It highlights the importance for firms to recognize that which 
chief executives should be responsible for which internal control management and to provide 
appropriate supervision.  
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 Appendix: Variable Descriptions 
Variables    Operational Definitions 
CIO  DV  An indicator variable that takes the value of  one if there is CIO turnover in 
year (t+1) and zero if otherwise 
REM  DV  An indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is remediation of 
ITMW in year (t+2) and zero if otherwise 
ITMW  IV  An indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm reports an ITMW 
in year (t) and zero if otherwise 
MW  CV  The number of internal control material weaknesses as reported by a firm in 
year (t) 
CEO  CV  An indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is CEO turnover in 
year (t+1) and zero if otherwise 
CFO  CV  An indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is CFO turnover in 
year (t+1) and zero if otherwise 
BD  CV  The change in the number of board director as reported by a firm between 
year (t) and year (t+1) 
AT  CV  The logarithm of total asset in year (t) 
LEV  CV  The ratio of total liabilities to total assets in year (t) 
CUR  CV  The ratio of current assets to current liabilities in year (t) 
ROA  CV  The ratio of net income to total assets in year (t) 
CASH  CV  Cash from operations scaled by total assets in year (t) 
RES  CV  An indicator variable that takes the value of  one if the firm announces a 
restatement in year (t) and zero if otherwise 
LOSS  CV  An indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm reports a net loss 
in year (t) and zero otherwise 
BIG4  CV  An in indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm has a big4 
auditor in year (t) and zero if otherwise 
BD  CV  The change in the number of board director as reported by a firm between 
year (t+1) and year (t+2) 
AT  CV  The change in AT (logarithm of total asset) as reported by a firm between 
year (t+1) and year (t+2) 
LEV  CV  The change in LEV (total liabilities divided by total assets) as reported by a 
firm between year (t+1) and year (t+2) 
ROA  CV  The change in ROA (net income divided by total assets) as reported by a 
firm between year (t+1) and year (t+2) 
LOSS  CV  The change in LOSS (one if a firm reports a net loss; zero otherwise) as 
reported by a firm between year (t+1) and year (t+2) 
CUR  CV  The change in CUR (current assets divided by current liabilities) as 
reported by a firm between year (t+1) and year (t+2) 
CASH  CV  The change in CASH (cash from operations divided by total assets) as 
reported by a firm between year (t+1) and year (t+2) 
BIG4  CV  The change in BIG4 (one if a firm has a big4; zero otherwise) as reported 
by a firm between year (t+1) and year (t+2) 
RES  CV  The change in RES (one if the firm announces a restatement; zero 
otherwise) as reported by a firm between year (t+1) and year (t+2) 
IND  CV  An indicator variable for industry fixed effect 
YEAR  CV  An indicator variable for year fixed effect 
 
 
 
